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Abstract
Using contextual equivalence (a.k.a. observational equivalence) to specify security properties is an important idea in the field
of formal verification of cryptographic protocols. While contextual equivalence is difficult to prove directly, one is usually able to
deduce it using the so-called logical relations in typed λ-calculi. We apply this technique to the cryptographic metalanguage—an
extension of Moggi’s computational λ-calculus, where we use Stark’s model for name creation to explore the difficult aspect of
dynamic key generation. The categorical construction of logical relations for monadic types (by Goubault-Larrecq et al.) then allows
us to derive logical relations over the category SetI . Although SetI is a perfectly adequate model of dynamic key generation, it
lacks in some aspects when we study relations between programs in the metalanguage. This leads us to an interesting exploration
of what should be the proper category to consider. We show that, to define logical relations in the cryptographic metalanguage, a
better choice of category is SetI→ that we proposed in [Y. Zhang, D. Nowak, Logical relations for dynamic name creation, in:
Proceedings of the 17th International Workshop of Computer Science Logic and the 8th Kurt Gödel Colloqium, CSL & KGL, in:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2803, Springer-Verlag, 2003, pp. 575–588]. However, this category is still lacking in some
subtler aspects and we propose a refined category SetPI→ to fix the flaws, but our final choice is SetI×I , which is equivalent
to SetPI→ . We define the contextual equivalence based on SetI×I and show that the cryptographic logical relation derived over
SetI×I is sound and can be used to verify protocols in practice.
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1. Introduction
Using contextual equivalence (a.k.a. observational equivalence) to specify security properties is by now a popular
idea in the field of formal verification of cryptographic protocols [3,30]. Contextual equivalence is difficult to prove
directly because of the universal quantification over infinitely many contexts, but in typed λ-calculi, one can deduce
it using the so-called logical relations [17,25,24,30].
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Logical relations are a powerful tool for proving various important properties in the typed λ-calculus (after [27],
see [17, Chapter 8] for a survey). The idea of using this technique to study security protocols was pioneered by Sumii
and Pierce [30]. They defined a language called the cryptographic λ-calculus and proposed various (operational)
logical relations that can establish contextual equivalence in their language. The main difficulty in this approach is
the manipulation of dynamic key generation. At this point, Sumii and Pierce rest on Pitts and Stark’s work on the nu-
calculus—a language for reasoning about dynamically created names in higher-order functions. Pitts and Stark define
an operational logical relation for the nu-calculus and show that it can identify contextual equivalence for types up to
first order (both sound and complete) [25]. The cryptographic λ-calculus is indeed an extension of the nu-calculus with
cryptographic primitives, where Sumii and Pierce succeed in adapting Pitts and Stark’s operational logical relation in
the cryptographic setting.
While these operational logical relations rely largely on the operational semantics, Stark also defines a denotational
logical relation based on the categorical model SetI for the nu-calculus [29]. The model SetI is based on Moggi’s
insight of “computations as monads” [21] and the dynamic name creation is indeed a typical form of computation
that can be described using monads.1 Stark precises what should be satisfied to model name creation and shows that
the category SetI is a perfectly adequate model for the nu-calculus. Then he extends this category using O’Hearn
and Tennent’s technique of “categories of relations” [24], so that the extended category gives immediately a logical
relation for the nu-calculus. Stark also proves that such defined denotational logical relations identify their operational
logical relation for types up to second order.
As we shall see in Section 3.1, a better model for deriving logical relations is the one based on scones [19,14].
While the construction in the scone-based model was initially developed over cartesian closed categories (CCCs),
Goubault-Larrecq et al. have extended it in CCCs equipped with strong monads in order to derive logical relations for
monadic types [7]. They also adapt their construction in the model SetI and define a (denotational) logical relation
for the name creation monad.
However, it is noticed in [32] that the category SetI , though it is adequate for modeling dynamic name creation,
is not sufficient for studying relations between programs involving name creation—logical relations derived over this
category are too weak in the sense that some obviously contextually equivalent programs are not related. A category
SetI→ is also proposed in [32], and it is proved to be better than SetI for clarifying relations between programs in the
nu-calculus. However, we find that the category SetI→ is still lacking in some subtle aspects, so we propose another
category called SetPI→ by fixing the flaws in SetI→ , where PI→ is the category we define. While PI→ is actually
equivalent to I × I, we eventually use the category SetI×I to define logical relations for the name creation monad.
Logical relations can be applied in the setting of cryptographic protocols. We start by defining, in Section 2, a
cryptographic metalanguage—an extension of Moggi’s computational λ-calculus, and we use Stark’s model SetI to
define the semantics. Section 3 introduces the categorical derivation of logical relations based on scones and shows
how to construct logical relations over the categories SetI and SetI→ . In Section 4 we first define a refined category
PI→ and show that the flaws in SetI→ can be fixed by replacing I→ with PI→. But to define logical relations for
the cryptographic metalanguage, we finally adopt the category SetI×I since PI→ is actually equivalent to I × I.
We then define a cryptographic logical relation for the metalanguage, using SetI×I . Section 5 gives an application
in protocol verification: the cryptographic logical relation is used to relate different instances of the Needham–
Schroeder–Lowe’s public key protocol. A proper notion of contextual equivalence for the cryptographic metalanguage
language is given in Section 6, also based on the category SetI×I . We show that the cryptographic logical relation
derived over SetI×I is sound. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. The cryptographic metalanguage
2.1. Syntax
The essential common part of the nu-calculus and the cryptographic λ-calculus is that they both allow us to
express dynamic key (or name) generation at the syntactic level. While Sumii and Pierce’s reasoning rests only
on the operational semantics, Stark defines also a denotational model for interpreting the nu-calculus [29]. Stark’s
1 The dynamic name creation monad is not mentioned in [21], but a more general monad for dynamic resource allocation is given in [20].
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model is not built directly on the nu-calculus but through an intermediate language: he extends Moggi’s computational
λ-calculus [21] with a base type for names and a constant new, and uses the category SetI to interpret this intermediate
language. The reason of choosing Moggi’s language here is that dynamic key generation can be seen as a typical form
of computation and can be nicely encoded in the framework of the computational λ-calculus, using monads [21]. Stark
then proves that the nu-calculus can be faithfully interpreted in the computational metalanguage, thus the model SetI
also serves as the denotational model of the nu-calculus.
For specifying and reasoning about cryptographic protocols, we extend directly Stark’s computational metalan-
guage so that we can make direct use of Stark’s denotational model. Doing so also bypasses the detour of defining a
language like the nu-calculus or the cryptographic λ-calculus and translating it into the computational λ-calculus.
The cryptographic metalanguage is an extension of Stark’s computational metalanguage with cryptographic
primitives. Types are defined by the following grammar:
τ ::= nat | key | msg | τ → τ | τ × τ | opt[τ ] | Tτ.
nat, key and msg are three base types, for integers, keys and messages respectively. τ × τ ′ is the type for cartesian
products. opt[τ ] is an option type for τ , which contains a null value besides values of τ . T is the unary type constructor
from Moggi’s computational λ-calculus: Tτ is the type for computations that will return a value of type τ . In the
cryptographic metalanguage, the difference between computations and values is that a computation may generate
fresh keys before it returns a value.
Expressions in the cryptographic metalanguage are defined by
t, t1, t2, . . . ::= x variables
| i integer constants 0, 1, 2, . . .
| nat_opn(t1, · · · , tn) integer operations
| eq(t1, t2) equality test of integers
| λx .t abstraction
| t1 t2 application
| 〈t1, t2〉 pairing
| proj1(t) | proj2(t) projections
| some(t) | noneτ option injections
| case t of some(x) in t1 else t2 option case
| new fresh key generation
| val(t) trivial computation
| let x ⇐ t1 in t2 sequential computation
| enc(t1, t2) | dec(t1, t2) encryption, decryption
| p(t1, t2) message pairing
| fst(t) | snd(t) message projections
| k(t) | getkey(t) keys as /from messages
| n(t) | getnum(t) integer as/from messages
Types are assigned to terms according to typing rules in Fig. 1. Typing rules are of the form Γ ` t : τ , where
Γ is the typing context mapping variables to types. Most rules of Fig. 1 are standard, such as pairing, projection,
injection, case and so on. Note that the equality test is useful for encoding protocols (see Section 5), but instead
of introducing the boolean type, we let the type of eq(n1, n2) be opt[nat]: if n1 equals n2, it is equivalent to
some(n1); otherwise, it is the null value. In particular, the conditional if n1 = n2 then t1 else t2 can be encoded as
case eq(n1, n2) of some(_) in t1 else t2.
The val and let are two constructions from the computational λ-calculus: val(t) denotes the trivial computation
which does nothing but returns t as the value; let x ⇐ t1 in t2 denotes the sequential computation which first does
the computation t1, binds its result to x , then computes t2. A special constant new stands for fresh key generation,
which generates a fresh key and returns this key as a value. It is a computation of type Tkey.
enc and dec are two typical cryptographic primitives, standing for encryption and decryption respectively:
enc(t1, t2) uses the key obtained from t2 to encrypt the message obtained from t1 and returns the encrypted message;
dec(t1, t2) uses the key obtained from t2 to decrypt the message obtained from t1, and returns the corresponding plain-
text (if the decryption succeeds) or an error (if the decryption fails), so it is of type opt[msg]. One can take an integer
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Fig. 1. Typing rules for the metalanguage.
or a key as a message, by the operations n and k. Constants getnum and getkey are the inverse operations, which
attempt to retrieve an integer or a key from a message. Messages can also be paired by a particular pairing operation
p for messages. Note that the message pairing is different from the normal pairing (〈_, _〉): p(_, _) is of typemsg, not
msg×msg. Correspondingly, we have projections fst and snd that return the components of a pairing message.
In fact, the msg type also differentiates our metalanguage from Sumii and Pierce’s language, where they use a
type constructor bits[_] to specify the type of cipher-texts—for every type τ , bits[τ ] denotes the type of encrypted
messages of type τ . Using a unary type msg has certain advantages. For instance, we can express type confusing
attacks [15,9,16] in our language without introducing dynamic type checking. Also, msg being a base type, the
language can be easily extended with extra cryptographic primitives satisfying special algebraic properties. Moreover,
adding or removing message primitives will not affect our derivation of logical relations.
2.2. Protocol specifications in the cryptographic metalanguage
The cryptographic metalanguage defined in the previous subsection is sufficient (with necessary extra
cryptographic primitives) to specify cryptographic protocols. In particular, with only symmetric cryptography in the
language, the λ-calculus allows us to express asymmetric cryptography (public keys are encoded as functions) [30].
We shall use a simple protocol to illustrate the idea of encoding cryptographic protocols in the setting of λ-calculus.
Another complex example is given in Section 5 and more examples can be found in [30,31].
Protocols usually involve several principals running in parallel and interacting with each other through messages.
The basic idea of encoding such a protocol in the λ-calculus is that every principal will be encoded as a function
which takes incoming messages as arguments and outcoming messages as results; interactions between principals are
modeled by function applications. Consider the following naive protocol:
Message 1. A → B : {i}k,
Message 2. B → A : i mod 2.
In this protocol, k is a secret key shared only by A and B. A encrypts an integer i with k and sends it to B (Message
1); when B receives a message, it decrypts the message with key k and replies with the result modulo 2. The protocol
Y. Zhang / Theoretical Computer Science 394 (2008) 39–63 43
is encoded as the following program, parametrized by the secret message i :
p(i) = let k ⇐ new in
val(〈λ_.enc(i, k), λx . case dec(x, k) of some(y) in (y mod 2) else 3〉).
We let k be freshly generated in this program in order to guarantee that k is not accessible by attackers—it is shared
only by the two principals. The first component of the pair, seen as a constant function λ_.enc(i, k), represents the
principal A. The second component represents the principal B—a function that receives a message and returns another
message.
Interactions between principals are scheduled by the network and every scheduler is encoded as a function, taking
the protocol program as an argument. Schedulers have the full control of the network. A “good” scheduler simply
forwards every message to its intended receiver according to the protocol, and it is easy to check whether the system
accomplishes its goal. Schedulers can be malicious too, and what interests us here is whether cryptographic protocols
can protect secret messages from these malicious schedulers. We focus on the secrecy property: the secrets do not leak
under any schedule.
The secrecy property is difficult to prove—direct quantification over all possible schedulers is certainly not
possible. From another aspect, if any two executions of a given protocol are just identical in the eyes of attackers—they
follow the same trace and the difference between secret messages is erased by encryption,2 then we can conclude that
this protocol satisfies the secrecy property. Such an indistinguishable property can be formalized using the notion of
contextual equivalence, a.k.a. observational equivalence [3,30]. We say that two programs are contextually equivalent,
if we always get the same observable results when running them in all contexts (here contexts are schedulers). Consider
the encoding of a given protocol in the metalanguage, i.e., a program with the secret message as a parameter. If we
can prove that every two instances of this program are contextually equivalent, we assert that this protocol satisfies
the secrecy property. For instance, in the previous protocol, if the principal A sends only encrypted even numbers to
B, then for any secret integers i and j , the two instances p(2 ∗ i) and p(2 ∗ j) are equivalent, since the reply from B
is always 0—no attacker can see the difference and get the secrets.
2.3. Categorical models
Stark’s denotational model for his computational metalanguage is a functor category SetI equipped with a strong
monad T. This model can be adapted here to interpret the cryptographic metalanguage as it is an extension of Stark’s
computational metalanguage.
In the category SetI , objects are functors from I to Set and morphisms are natural transformations between these
functors. Here I is the category of finite sets and injective functions. Intuitively, objects of I represent computation
stages—every object of I contains keys (or names) that have been generated at a certain stage. For any functor
A : I → Set , the set As is composed of values defined over the keys in s. Morphisms in I and their images in
Set correspond to substitutions: if i : s → s′ is a morphism in I and a ∈ As, then Ai(a) is the value obtained by
substituting every name n ∈ s with i(n) in the value a.
This category is cartesian closed. Let A, B be two functors from I to Set . Products and coproducts are taken
pointwise. Exponentials are defined by the standard construction in covariant presheaves [12]:
BAs = SetI(I(s,−)× A, B),
BAi f s′′〈 j, a′′〉 = f s′′〈 j ◦ i, a′′〉,
where i : s → s′, j : s′ → s′′ ∈ I and f ∈ BAs, a′′ ∈ As′′. An equivalent way to define the exponential in SetI is:
BAs = SetI(A(s + _), B(s + _)),
where+ denotes the disjoint union of sets.3 This definition says that a function from A to B defined at stage s includes
information on how it behaves at all later stages.
2 Regarding encrypted messages as indistinguishable is a classical hypothesis in most formal models for cryptographic protocols. The secrecy
property based on this hypothesis is usually called the strong secrecy [1].
3 Note that + is not a coproduct in I. In fact, I does not have a coproduct. However + is functorial in both components, associative, and has a
neutral element.
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Consider the strong monad (T, η, µ, t) on SetI defined in [29,7]:
• TA = colims′ A(_ + s′) : I → Set . On objects, TAs = colims′ A(s + s′) is the set of all equivalence
classes of pairs (s′, a), with s′ ∈ I and a ∈ A(s + s′), modulo the smallest equivalence relation ' such that
(s′, a) ' (s′′, A(ids + j)a) for every morphism j : s′ → s′′ in I. We write [s′, a] for the equivalence class of
(s′, a). On morphisms, TAi with i : s → s1 ∈ I, maps the equivalence class [s′, a] to the equivalence class
[s′, A(i + ids′)a].
• For any f : A → B in SetI , T f s : TAs → TBs is defined by T f s[s′, a] = [s′, f (s + s′)a]. This is compatible
with ' because f is natural.
• ηAs : As → TAs is defined by ηAsa = [∅, a].
• µAs : T2As → TAs is defined by µAs[s′, [s′′, a]] = [s′ + s′′, a].
• tA,Bs : As × TBs → T(A × B)s is defined by tA,Bs(a, [s′, b]) = [s′, (Ais,s′a, b)] where is,s′ : s → s + s′ is the
canonical injection.
A set TA is meant to be the denotation of a computation type. The semantics of a computation of key generation—
(s′, a) consists of a set s′ of fresh keys generated during the computation, and a final value a. If s is the set of already
generated keys before the execution of the computation, the final value a must be defined over the set (s + s′). Two
computations (s1, a1), (s2, a2) ∈ TAs are equivalent ((s1, a1) ' (s2, a2)) if and only if there exists a finite set s0 and
two morphisms i1 : s1 → s0, i2 : s2 → s0 such that A(ids + i1)a1 = A(ids + i2)a2.
Define two functors N , K : I → Set (as the denotations of nat and key): N maps every object to the set of natural
numbers, and every morphism to the identity function; K is the identity functor. To interpret the message type msg,
we define a functor M : I → Set :
• for every s ∈ I, Ms is the smallest set which satisfies the following conditions:
. if a ∈ Ks, then k(a) ∈ Ms;
. if a ∈ Ns, then n(a) ∈ Ms;
. if a ∈ Ms and k ∈ s, then e(a, k) ∈ Ms;
. if a1, a2 ∈ Ms, then p(a1, a2) ∈ Ms.
• for every i : s → s′ ∈ I, Mi is a function from Ms to Ms′ defined by:
. if x = n(a) for some a ∈ Ns, then Mi(x) = n(Ni(a));
. if x = k(a) for some a ∈ Ks, then Mi(x) = k(Ki(a));
. if x = e(a, k) for some a ∈ Ms and k ∈ s, then Mi(x) = e(Mi(a), Ki(k));
. if x = p(a1, a2) for some a1, a2 ∈ Ms, then Mi(x) = p(Mi(a1),Mi(a2)).
Types in the cryptographic metalanguage are interpreted as objects of SetI :
JnatK = N , JkeyK = K , JmsgK = M, Jτ × τ ′K = JτK× Jτ ′K,Jopt[τ ]K = JτK+ 1⊥, Jτ → τ ′K = Jτ ′KJτK, JTτK = T JτK,
where we assume that ⊥ is a terminal object in Set and 1⊥ is a terminal object in SetI defined by:
∀s ∈ I, 1⊥s = {⊥} and ∀i : s → s′ ∈ I, 1⊥i = id{⊥}.
The denotation of every well-typed term Γ ` t : τ is a morphism from JΓ K to JτK, where JΓ K = ∏x :τi∈Γ Jτi K. In
other words, JΓ ` t : τK is a natural transformation such that for every s ∈ I, JΓ ` t : τKs is a function from JΓ Ks
to JτKs. We then define a Γ -environment ρ, for every context Γ and every s ∈ I, as a function which maps every
variable x (x : τ ∈ Γ ) to an element of JτKs.
Note that such an environment ρ can be seen as an element of JΓ Ks and we shall write later on ρ ∈ JΓ Ks. WhenJΓ Ks is an empty set, e.g. Γ = {x : key} and s = ∅, we simply mean that there is no such environment for these Γ
and s. If ρ ∈ JΓ Ks, we write ρ[x 7→ a] as an environment mapping the variable x to the element a and every variable
x ′ : τ ∈ Γ (other than x) to ρ(x ′). The meaning of a term Γ ` t : τ over a set s and in an environment ρ ∈ JΓ Ks, is
accordingly described as a value JΓ ` t : τKsρ in JτKs, by induction on typing derivations. We write JtKs instead ofJtKsρ when the environment ρ is irrelevant, e.g., t is a closed term.
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JΓ ` λx .t : τ → τ ′Ksρ = the unique f ∈ Jτ → τ ′Ks such that for all
i : s → s′ ∈ I and for all a ∈ JτKs′, f s′(i, a) =JΓ , x : τ ` t : τ ′Ks′(JΓ Ki(ρ) ∪ {x 7→ a}).JΓ ` t1t2 : τ ′Ksρ = JΓ ` t1 : τ → τ ′Ksρ(ids, JΓ ` t2 : τKsρ).JΓ ` val(t) : TτKsρ = [∅, JΓ ` t : τKsρ].JΓ ` let x ⇐ t1 in t2 : Tτ ′Ksρ = [s1 + s2, a2],where JΓ ` t1 : TτKsρ = [s1, a1]
and JΓ , x : τ ` t2 : Tτ ′K(s + s1)ρ′ = [s2, a2]
where ρ′(x) = a1, ρ′(yi ) = Jτi K(inls,s1)(ρ(yi ))
for every yi : τi ∈ Γ .JΓ ` new : keyKsρ = [{k}, k], where k 6∈ s.JΓ ` enc(t1, t2) : msgKsρ = e(JΓ ` t1 : msgKsρ, JΓ ` t2 : keyKsρ).
JΓ ` dec(t1, t2) : opt[msg]Ksρ =

a, if JΓ ` t1 : msgKsρ = e(a, k)
and JΓ ` t2 : keyKsρ = k,
for some a ∈ JmsgKs and k ∈ s;
⊥, otherwise.
Fig. 2. Interpretation of the metalanguage terms.
Fig. 2 lists the interpretation of several terms. Others are standard. Note that we are using here some kind of free-
algebra for interpreting operations on the msg type. In particular, for the two cryptographic primitives enc and dec,
a basic algebra property is required to hold:
∀ s ∈ I, a ∈ JmsgKs, k ∈ s, JdecKs(JencKs(a, k), k) = a.
More algebraic properties might be necessary for extra cryptographic primitives [5].
3. Logical relations
3.1. Preliminary
Consider a set-theoretical model of the simply-typed lambda calculus. A (binary) logical relation is a family
(Rτ )τ type of binary relations Rτ on JτK, one for each type τ , defined by induction on the type structure. Essentially,
two functions are related if and only if they map related arguments to related results, i.e., for every pair of functions
f1, f2 ∈ Jτ → τ ′K, the following condition must hold:
(Log) f1 Rτ→τ ′ f2 ⇐⇒ ∀a1, a2 ∈ JτK, a1 Rτ a2 ⇒ f1(a1) Rτ ′ f2(a2).
This is the standard definition of logical relations in the λ-calculus [27,17].
The (Log) condition entails notably the so-called basic lemma. To state it, first say that two Γ -environments ρ1,
ρ2 are related by the logical relation, in notation ρ1 RΓ ρ2, if and only if ρ1(x) Rτ ρ2(x) for every x : τ in Γ . The
basic lemma states that if Γ ` t : τ is derivable, and ρ1, ρ2 are two related Γ -environments, then JtKρ1 Rτ JtKρ2.
This is proved by a simple induction on the typing derivation of t [17]. We are particularly interested in the basic
lemma because, as observed e.g. in [30], this implies that for all logical relations that coincide with the equality on
observation types (booleans, integers, etc.), two terms with related values must be contextually equivalent.
The standard definition of logical relations is derived from a general construction over CCCs [19]. Fix two
categories C and C and a functor |_| : C → C . The comma category (C ↓ |_|) is the category whose objects are
triples 〈S, f, A〉, with f : S → |A| in C , and whose morphisms are pairs 〈u, v〉 : 〈S, f, A〉 → 〈S′, f ′, A′〉 with
u : S → S′ ∈ C and v : A → A′ ∈ C, such that the following square commutes in C :
S
f //
u

|A|
|v|

S′
f ′ // |A′|
.
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This category is also called the scone of C over C . The second projection functor U : (C ↓ |_|) → C (also seen as a
forgetful functor) maps 〈S, f, A〉 to A and a morphism 〈u, v〉 to v. The full subcategory of this scone consisting of all
objects 〈S, f, A〉 with f a mono is called the subscone of C over C , denoted by SubsconeCC .
A remarkable feature of sconing is that it preserves almost all additional categorical structures that C might have
(see [6] for further discussion). In particular, if both C and C are CCCs and C has pullbacks, and if the functor |_|
preserves finite products, then SubsconeCC is a CCC as well [11,14].
The categorical construction of logical relations goes as follows. Let Σb be the set of base types in the signature
Σ , seen as a discrete category. Define a CCC λ(Σ ) with objects being typing contexts Γ and morphisms being
substitutions, i.e., a morphism from Γ = {x1 : τ1, . . . , xn : τn} to ∆ = {y1 : τ ′1, . . . , ym : τ ′m} is a substitution[y1 := t1, . . . , ym := tm], where Γ ` ti : τ ′i (1 ≤ i ≤ m), modulo βη-conversion. λ(Σ ) is a free CCC, which
means that, for every CCC C and for every functor J_Kb from Σb to C, there exists a unique representation J_KC of
CCCs from λ(Σ ) to C such that the following diagram commutes:
Σb
⊆ //
J_Kb
""D
DD
DD
DD
DD
DD
λ(Σ )
J_KC

C
. (1)
A representation of CCCs is any functor that preserves products and exponentials.
AssumeC is another CCC with pullbacks. Similarly, we have a unique representation J_KC from λ(Σ ) toC . Let |_|
be a functor from C to C such that |_| preserves terminal objects and finite products, and it holds that |JbKC | = JbKC .
This gives rise to a subscone of C overC , denoted by SubsconeCC . Suppose thatRb is a functor fromΣb to SubsconeCC ,
i.e., a collection of objects in SubsconeCC , one for each base type b. Then there is a unique representationR of CCCs
from λ(Σ ) to SubsconeCC such that the following diagram commutes:
Σb
⊆ //
(Rb)b∈Σ

λ(Σ )
R
zzuuu
uu
uu
uu
uu
u
SubsconeCC
. (2)
Define a forgetful functor U : SubsconeCC → C, which maps an object 〈S,m, A〉 to A and a morphism 〈u, v〉
to v. Clearly, U is a representation of CCCs. so U ◦ R is a representation of CCCs as well, from λ(Σ ) to C. If
U ◦ (Rb)b∈Σ = J_Kb, then by the uniqueness property of J_KC , we must have U ◦ R = J_KC , i.e., the following
diagram commutes:
λ(Σ )
R
zzuuu
uu
uu
uu
uu
u
J_KC

SubsconeCC U
// C
. (3)
Now let C = Set , C = Set × Set and let |_| be the functor Π : Set × Set → Set—the right adjunction of the
diagonal functor. Every binary relation S ⊆ A1 × A2 (A1, A2 ∈ Set) has a representation 〈pi S1 , pi S2 〉 : S ↪→ A1 × A2,
where the arrow is the inclusion induced by two projections pi S1 : S → A1 and pi S2 : S → A2. R(τ ) is of the form
S ↪→ JτK× JτK, where J_K is the interpretation of lambda terms in set-theoretical models (J_KC = 〈J_K, J_K〉), and S,
up to isomorphism, is just a subset of JτK× JτK. Then R(τ ) behaves like a logical relation: the object part of functor
R yields logical relations (or extensions) in set-theoretical models. In particular, the fact thatR preserve exponentials
state the (Log) condition:
( f1, f2) ∈ R(τ → τ ′)⇐⇒ ∀(a1, a2) ∈ R(τ ), ( f1(a1), f2(a2)) ∈ R(τ ′);
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the morphism part of functorR maps each morphism [y := t] : Γ → {y : τ } in λ(Σ ), namely a typed term Γ ` t : τ
modulo βη, to a morphism in the subscone, i.e., a pair 〈u, v〉 with v = (JΓ ` t : τK, JΓ ` t : τK), according to the
commuting diagram (3). The fact that 〈u, v〉 is a morphism, i.e., the following diagram commutes:
SΓ
  R(Γ ) //
u

JΓ K× JΓ K
v=(JΓ`t :τK,JΓ`t :τK)

Sτ
  R(τ ) // JτK× JτK
,
states the basic lemma: for every pair of environments ρ1 and ρ2,
(ρ1, ρ2) ∈ R(Γ ) =⇒ (JΓ ` t : τKρ1, JΓ ` t : τKρ2) ∈ R(τ ).
3.2. Logical relations derived over the category SetI
Applying the categorical construction to the model SetI , we shall get a logical relation for reasoning about name
creation [7]. Let C = SetI , C = SetI × SetI , |_| be the functor Π . An object 〈pi S1 , pi S2 〉 : S ↪→ |A1 × A2|
(S, A1, A2 ∈ SetI ) in SubsconeSetISetI×SetI is a representation of a series of binary relations, such that for every
s ∈ I, 〈pi S1 , pi S2 〉s : Ss ↪→ A1s × A2s is an inclusion (up to isomorphism). In other words, S is a family of relations
Ss between A1s and A2s, functorial in s:
∀i : s → s′ ∈ I, (a1, a2) ∈ Ss =⇒ (A1i(a1), A2i(a2)) ∈ Ss′.
Logical relations defined over functor categories are Kripke logical relations (an object s in I is usually called
a “world”) [18], and the above functoriality is the so-called monotonicity property of Kripke logical relations.
Exponentials in SubsconeSet
I
SetI×SetI define relations for functions: let Y
X = S ↪→ B1A1 × B2A2 be an exponential,
where X = SA ↪→ A1 × A2 and Y = SB ↪→ B1 × B2, then for every s ∈ I and for every pair of functions
f1 ∈ B1A1s, f2 ∈ B2A2s (recall that in the category SetI , fk is a natural transformation such that for every
i : s → s′ ∈ I, fks′ is a morphism from I(s, s′)× Aks′ to Bks′):
( f1, f2) ∈ Ss ⇐⇒
∀i : s → s′ ∈ I, a1 ∈ A1s′, a2 ∈ A2s′,
(a1, a2) ∈ SAs′ ⇒ ( f1s′(i, a1), f2s′(i, a2)) ∈ SBs′.
(4)
This is the so-called comprehension property of Kripke logical relations.
The category SetI is equipped with a strong monad, which is essential for interpreting monadic types and
corresponding constructs. The categorical construction of logical relations for monadic types is given in [7]. It follows
the same pattern as in standard λ-calculus, but instead of λ(Σ ), we must consider here the free let-CCC Comp(Σ )
over Σ . A let-CCC is a CCC equipped with a strong monad. In order to make the diagram (1) commute, we must
also require C to be a let-CCC, and J_KC to be a representation of let-CCCs, i.e., a functor that preserves products,
exponentials, and the strong monad (functor, unit, multiplication, strength).
We then need SubsconeCC to be a let-CCC to establish the diagram (2). This can be done by the following
construction in [7], where Goubault-Larrecq et al. define lifting of a strong monad (T, η, µ, t) on C to another monad
(T˜ , η˜, µ˜,˜ t) on SubsconeCC . Certain requirements must be satisfied for their lifting:
• |_| : C → C preserves finite products;
• a strong monad (T,η,µ, t) on C , related to (T, η, µ, t) by a monad morphism σ : T|_| → |T_|, making the
following diagram commute:
|A| ×T|B| id|A|×σB //
t|A|,|B|

|A| × |TB| |A × TB|
|tA,B |

T(|A| × |B|) T|A × B| σA×B // |T(A × B)|;
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• a mono factorization system on C , which is essentially an epi-mono factorization [4] without the requirement
for epis. Formally, a mono factorization system is given by two distinguished subclasses of morphisms in C , the
so-called pseudoepis // // and the so-called relevant monos ◦ // . The latter must be monos, while the
former is not necessarily epis. Both classes must contain all isomorphisms and be closed under composition with
isomorphisms. Each morphism f inC must factor as f = m ◦ e for some pseudoepi e and some relevant mono m.
For each commuting diagram as the one on the left, there is a unique diagonal making both triangles commute in
the right diagram:
• // //

•
• ◦ // •
• // //

•
• ◦ // •
• pseudoepis are preserved by T and finite products.
The diagram (3) still commutes, whereR, U and J_KC are representations of let-CCCs. If we replaceC by Set and C
by Set × Set ,R(τ ) is a subset of JτK× JτK, up to isomorphism. The fact thatR preserves (strong) monads give rise
to the logical relation for monadic types:
(a1, a2) ∈ R(Tτ)⇐⇒ (a2, a2) ∈ T˜R(τ ).
Now consider the strong monad T over SetI as defined in Section 2.3, SetI has a mono factorization consisting
of pointwise surjections and pointwise injections. For any A1, A2 ∈ SetI , define the functor morphism σ by
σ〈A1,A2〉 = 〈Tpi1,Tpi2〉, which is a natural transformation from T(A1 × A2) to TA1 × TA2 such that for every
s ∈ I, a1 ∈ A1(s + s′), a2 ∈ A2(s + s′):
σ〈A1,A2〉s[s′, (a1, a2)] = ([s′, a1], [s′, a2]).
It is clear that T and finite product preserves pointwise surjections, so all the requirements are met for lifting
the monad T on SetI × SetI to SubsconeSetISetI×SetI , with a strong monad T˜ . Let 〈pi S1 , pi S2 〉 : S ↪→ A1 × A2 be
the representation of a series of binary relations between A1s and A2s (s ∈ I). The monadic component of logical
relations, denoted S˜, is given by mono factorization of σ〈A1,A2〉 ◦ T〈pi S1 , pi S2 〉:
TS
T〈pi S1 ,pi S2 〉 //

T(A1 × A2)
σ〈A1,A2〉

S˜ ◦ // TA1 × TA2
.
For every s ∈ I, S˜s is defined as the direct image of (σ〈A1,A2〉 ◦ T〈pi S1 , pi S2 〉)s, which is proved to be equal to
〈Tpi S1 ,Tpi S2 〉s [7]. Then we get the following relation between monadic values, considering the equivalence relation':
[s1, a1] S˜s [s2, a2] ⇐⇒
∃ s′ ∈ I, a′1 ∈ A1(s + s′), a′2 ∈ A2(s + s′),
(s1, a1) ' (s′, a′1) & (s2, a2) ' (s′, a′2) & a′1 S(s + s′) a′2,
which, according to [7], is equivalent to
[s1, a1] S˜s [s2, a2] ⇐⇒
∃ s0 ∈ I, i1 : s1 → s0 ∈ I, i2 : s2 → s0 ∈ I,
A1(ids + i1)a1 S(s + s0) A2(ids + i2)a2.
(5)
3.3. Zhang and Nowak’s category SetI→
The category SetI is a perfectly adequate model for dynamic key generation, but logical relations derived over
SetI are too weak—they do not capture some obviously equivalent programs in the cryptographic metalanguage.
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This arises in particular from the lack of a mechanism of distinguishing between secret keys (keys that are not known
to attackers) and non-secret keys.4 Defining a proper relation for the base type key might be a solution, but such a
relation is not so obvious. For instance, a simple but non-trivial relation ofRskey is the identity relation on s, but logical
relations defined inductively from this relation are simply too weak to recognize the contextual equivalence between
some obviously equivalent programs. Consider the following programs:
p1 = let k ⇐ new in val(enc(n(0), k)),
p2 = let k′ ⇐ new in val(enc(n(1), k′)).
They are contextually equivalent because they both produce cipher-texts using freshly generated keys, but do not reveal
the key, so that no context can decrypt the messages. The denotations of the two terms are respectively [{k}, e(n(0), k)]
and [{k′}, e(n(1), k′)]. A natural relation between encrypted messages can be defined inductively on the message
structure [30], i.e., two cipher-texts are related if and only if they are related plain-texts encrypted by related keys
(here identical keys). According to (5), to relate the above two programs, one has to find a proper mapping (or
“renaming”) for the two fresh keys k and k′, which maps the two keys to either an identity key or two different keys.
But in any case, the two encrypted messages are not related, since the plain-texts are never related (obviously, the
relation for numbers is the identical relation so that the logical relation can deduce the contextual equivalence). In
fact, using simply the identity relation on s asRskey means that we cannot hide any keys from attackers!
One might argue that the relation for keys should not be so naive—we should take a more sophisticated one, e.g.,
as defined in Sumii and Pierce’s logical relations [30] or in the framed-bisimulation for the Spi-calculus [3,2]. In fact,
both manipulations are based on the idea that only non-secret keys can be related. In other words, attackers can only
check the equivalence between keys that they know. Extra parameters are necessary to represent the set of non-secret
keys, e.g. the “frame” in the framed-bisimulation. This can be reformulated in the setting of logical relations:
k1Rs,frkeyk2 ⇐⇒ k1 = k2 ∈ fr,
where fr is a parameter denoting the set of non-secret keys (fr ⊆ s). However, applying such a solution to the
denotational model makes the resulted logical relations hard to manipulate—the parameter fr changes when the
“world” s changes. A better solution is to consider a richer category than SetI , e.g. the category SetI→ that we
have proposed in [32], where fr is naturally encoded in the categorical construction.
Definition 1. Category I→ is the comma category (I ↓ |_|) where |_| is the identity functor from I to I. Precisely,
objects of I→ are tuples 〈w, i, s〉 and morphisms are pairs ( j, l) : 〈w, i, s〉 → 〈w′, i ′, s′〉 such that the following
diagram commutes:
w
j

i // s
l

w′ i
′
// s′
, (6)
where i, i ′, j, l are all injections in I.
The composite of two morphisms ( j, l) : i → i ′ and ( j ′, l ′) : i ′ → i ′′ is ( j ′ ◦ j, l ′ ◦ l). We write i for 〈w, i, s〉 when
the domain w and the codomain s are clear from the context. Intuitively, every object 〈w, i, s〉 of I→ represents a
selection of non-secret keys from a set s of keys. In fact, w, together with i , plays the same role of the “frame” in
framed-bisimulation, and we can define the relation for keys as follows:
k1R〈w,i,s〉key k2 ⇐⇒ k1 = k2 ∈ i(w). (7)
4 One should not confuse here secret/non-secret keys with private/public keys in the public key cryptography—we have only symmetric
cryptography in the metalanguage.
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Let SetI→ be the category of functors from I→ to Set and natural transformations.5 It is shown that all
requirements are met for deriving logical relations over the category SetI→ . In particular a strong monad (T,η,µ, t)
is defined on SetI→ :
• TA = colimi ′ A(_ + i ′) : I→ → Set , for every A ∈ SetI→ . On objects, TAi = colimi ′ A(i + i ′) is the set of
equivalence classes of pairs (i ′, a), where i ′ : w′ → s′ ∈ I and a ∈ A(i + i ′), modulo the smallest equivalence
relation ∼ such that (i ′, a) ∼ (i ′′, A(idi + ( j, k))a) for every morphism ( j, k) : 〈w′, i ′, s′〉 → 〈w′′, i ′′, s′′〉 in I→.
We write [i, a] for the equivalence class of (i, a). On morphisms, TA( j, k) maps the equivalence class of (i ′, a) to
the equivalence class of (i ′, A(( j, k)+ idi ′)a);
• T f i : TAi → TBi , for every f : A → B ∈ SetI→ , is defined by T f i[i ′, a] = [i ′, f (i + i ′)a]:
• η Ai : Ai → TAi is defined by η Aia = [∅, a], where ∅ denotes the empty function between empty sets;
• µAi : T2Ai → TAi is defined byµAi[i ′, [i ′′, a]] = [i ′ + i ′′, a];
• tA,B i : Ai × TBi → T(A × B)i is defined by tA,B i(a, [i ′, b]) = [i ′, (Ai→i,i ′a, b)] where i→i,i ′ : i → i + i ′ is the
canonical injection.
The functor |_| : SetI → SetI→ is the functor idSetU where U : I→ → I is the forgetful functor which
maps an object 〈w, i, s〉 to s and a morphism ( j, l) to l. On an object A, |A| is equal to A ◦ U , that is, for any
object 〈w, i, s〉 ∈ I→, |A|〈w, i, s〉 = As, and for any morphism ( j, l) ∈ I→, |A|( j, l) = Al. On a morphism f (a
natural transformation), for each 〈w, i, s〉 in I→, the component | f |〈w,i,s〉 is equal to fs . It is clear that the functor |_|
preserves finite products.
Let σ : T|_| → |T_| be the monad morphism defined by σAi[〈w′, i ′, s′〉, a] = [s′, a], for any object A in SetI
and 〈w, i, s〉 ∈ I→. This is well-defined as |A|(i + i ′) = A(s + s′). σ(A1,A2) : T|A1 × A2| → |TA1| × |TA2| is then
defined as 〈σA1 ◦T|pi1|, σA2 ◦T|pi2|〉:
σ(A1,A2)i[〈w′, i ′, s′〉, (a1, a2)] = ([s′, a1], [s′, a2]).
SetI→ has a mono factorization system consisting of pointwise surjections and pointwise injections, and it is clear that
T and finite products preserve pointwise surjections. We can then derive logical relations over SubsconeSet
I
SetI×SetI .
Note that the critical part of the subscone is SetI→ and we shall omit other parts in the following texts: when we say
“logical relations derived over C”, we are actually meaning “logical relations derived over SubsconeCSetI×SetI ”.
Consider f : S ↪→ |A1 × A2| (A1, A2 ∈ SetI and S ∈ SetI→ ) as a representation of a series of binary relations
such that for every 〈w, i, s〉 ∈ I→, f i : Si ↪→ |A1 × A2|i = (A1 × A2)s = A1s × A2s is an inclusion, representing
a binary relation. In particular, the relation between monadic values is given by mono factorization of the composite
of T f with σ(A1,A2):
TS
T f //

T|A1 × A2|
σ
(A1,A2)

S˜
  // |TA1| × |TA2|
.
We take S˜ as the direct image of σ(A1,A2) ◦T f , then for every i : w → s ∈ I:
[s1, a1] S˜i [s2, a2] ⇐⇒
∃ i ′ : w′ → s′ ∈ I, a′1 ∈ A1(s + s′), a′2 ∈ A2(s + s′),
(s1, a1) ' (s′, a′1) & (s2, a2) ' (s′, a′2) & a′1 S(i + i ′) a′2.
(8)
According to the definition of', (sk, ak) ' (s′, a′k) (k = 1, 2) means that there is a finite set s′k and two morphisms
lk : sk → s′k, l ′k : s′ → s′k in I such that Ak(ids + lk)ak = Ak(ids + l ′k)a′k . It is easy to check that there exist s0 with
two morphisms l ′′1 : s′1 → s0, l ′′2 : s′2 → s0 in I, such that l ′′1 ◦ l ′1 = l ′′2 ◦ l ′2, hence ids + (l ′′1 ◦ l ′1) = ids + (l ′′2 ◦ l ′2). Take
5 Note that SetI→ is not a newmodel for the cryptographic metalanguage—we still rest on the category SetI for interpreting the metalanguage.
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an arbitrary object 〈w0, i0, s0〉 and a morphism ( j, l) : i ′ → i0 in I→ where l = l ′′1 ◦ l ′1 = l ′′2 ◦ l ′2 (such objects and
morphisms necessarily exist). Because S is a functor from I→ to Set :
S(idi + ( j, l))(a′1, a′2)= |A1 × A2|(idi + ( j, l))(a′1, a′2)= (A1(ids + l)a′1, A2(ids + l)a′2)= (A1(ids + (l ′′1 ◦ l ′1))a′1, A2(ids + (l ′′2 ◦ l ′2))a′2)= (A1(ids + (l ′′1 ◦ l1))a1, A2(ids + (l ′′2 ◦ l2))a2)
i.e. A1(ids + (l ′′1 ◦ l1))a1 S(i + i0) A2(ids + (l ′′2 ◦ l2))a2. So if [s1, a1] S˜i [s2, a2], there exist an object
〈w0, i0, s0〉 and injections l01 : s1 → s0 and l02 : s2 → s0 in I→ (l01 = l ′′1 ◦ l ′1 and l02 = l ′′2 ◦ l ′2), such that
A1(ids + l01)a1 S(i + i0) A2(ids + l02)a2. Conversely, if this relation holds, the right-hand side of (8) holds as well,
with i ′ being i0, a′1 being A1(ids + l01)a1 and a′2 being A2(ids + l02)a2. (8) is thus equivalent to
[s1, a1] S˜i [s2, a2] ⇐⇒
∃ i0 : w0 → s0 ∈ I, l1 : s1 → s0 ∈ I, l2 : s2 → s0 ∈ I,
A1(ids + l1)a1 S(i + i0) A2(ids + l2)a2.
(9)
4. Cryptographic logical relations
4.1. The categories PI→ and I × I
Although the category I→ succeeds in separating secret keys from non-secret keys, logical relations derived over
SetI→ are still too weak. Consider the following two programs in the cryptographic metalanguage:
p1 = let k ⇐ new in val(λx .case dec(x, k) of some(_) in 1 else 0),
p2 = val(λx .0).
The key k in the first program is a fresh key and no context can build an encrypted message with k, so applying the
function to any possible arguments, contexts always get the value 0—the two programs are contextually equivalent.
Now assume that 〈w, i, s〉 is the “world” where we evaluate the two computations. The denotations of the two
programs are [{k}, f1] and [∅, f2], where f1 and f2 are denotations of the resulted functions. By (9), in order to
relate these two computations, we should relate the two functions at 〈w, i, s + {k}〉 (with the codomain of i changed to
s+{k}). Recall that logical relations derived over a functor category are Kripke logical relations and the comprehension
property (4), requires that the related functions must check related arguments at any “larger world”. Suppose that
we are in the “world” 〈w + {k}, i + id{k}, s + {k}〉. It is easy to check that there exists a morphism in I→ from
〈w, i, s + {k}〉 to 〈w + {k}, i + id{k}, s + {k}〉, so the latter is indeed a “larger world” in I→, where k is related to
itself according to (7). Applying the two functions f1, f2 to related values encrypted by k, e.g. ({0}k, {0}k), we shall
get non-related results—the above two equivalent programs are not related by logical relations derived over SetI→ .
The weakness comes from a subtle flaw in the definition of I→. In fact, the commuting diagram (6) says that,
when we pass from a world 〈w, i, s〉 to another 〈w′, i ′, s′〉, if w′ is large enough, we can actually get every key in
s mapped into i ′(w′), no matter whether it is in w or not. This means that in the I→ representation, attackers are
allowed, at proper “larger worlds”, to get all the keys that are secret at a smaller “world”. In other words, this model
cannot represent appropriately secret keys—if the “world” is large enough, attackers get all the keys.
To represent correctly the separation between secret keys and non-secret keys, we need more restriction on the
category I→. Intuitively, we should not allow attackers to get access to keys that are not disclosed, at any “larger
world”. This seems too strict, as in practice, sometimes a secret is only required to be hold for a limited duration,
so we might generate a fresh key and we do not disclose it immediately, until some later stage. In our approach, we
have to consider this key as a non-secret key, at any stage (or world) that contains it. In fact, one should be careful
of the meaning of “stage”—in our model, computation stages are represented by sets of keys, not by time. In the
cryptographic metalanguage, there is no way to express the disclosing of keys at particular time. Once we generate a
key in a program and at a certain point this key is accessible by contexts, then we just take it as a non-secret key when
defining logical relations, otherwise, it is seen as a secret key.
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More precisely, every morphism ( j, l) : 〈w, i, s〉 → 〈w′, i ′, s′〉 in I→ should make the following two conditions
hold:
• for every k ∈ w, i ′( j (k)) = l(i(k)), i.e., every key that is non-secret at the world i , must remain non-secret at the
world i ′. This is already guaranteed by the commutativity of the diagram (6);
• for every k ∈ s but k 6∈ i(w), l(k) 6∈ i ′(w′), i.e., every key that is not disclosed at the world i , must remain secret
at the world i ′.
For short, these two conditions are equivalent to the following equation:
i ′( j (w)) = l(i(w)) = l(s) ∩ i ′(w′). (10)
It turns out that if the diagram (6) is a pullback in I, then (10) necessarily holds.
Lemma 1. For every morphism ( j, l) : 〈w, i, s〉 → 〈w′, i ′, s′〉 in I→, i ′( j (w)) = l(i(w)) = l(s) ∩ i ′(w′) if and only
if the commuting square
w
i //
j 
s
l
w′ i
′
// s′
is a pullback in I.
Proof. First, assume that i ′( j (w)) = l(i(w)) = l(s) ∩ i ′(w′) and we show that the following diagram commutes for
every i0 : w0 → s ∈ I and ( j0, l) : i0 → i ′ ∈ I→:
w0
f
!!C
C
C
C
C
i0
$$
j0

w
i //
j

s
l

w′ i
′
// s′
. (11)
We must prove that the two triangles commute and the injection f : w0 → w is unique. Note that l(i0(w0)) =
i ′( j0(w0)) ⊆ l(s)∩ i ′(w′) because ( j0, l) is a morphism in I→. Define f by f (k0) = j−1( j0(k0)) for every k0 ∈ w0,
then
• f is a well-defined injection: because i ′( j0(w0)) ⊆ l(s) ∩ i ′(w′) = i ′( j (w)) and i ′ is injection, j0(w0) ⊆ j (w),
hence j−1( j0(k0)) is defined for any k0 ∈ w0. Obviously, f is injective since both j (as well as j−1 restricted over
j0(w0)) and j0 are injective;
• j ◦ f = j0 and i ◦ f = i0: the first is obvious. For any k0 ∈ w0,
l(i( f (k0))) = i ′( j ( f (k0))) (because i ′ ◦ j = l ◦ i)
= i ′( j ( j−1( j0(k0))))
= i ′( j0(k0)) = l(i0(k0)) (because i ′ ◦ j0 = l ◦ i0),
then i( f (k0)) = i0(k0) since l is injective;
• f is unique: suppose that there is another injection f ′ : w0 → w such that the diagram (11) commutes. Take any
k0 ∈ w0, j ( f (k0)) = j0(k0) = j ( f ′(k0)) and because j is injective, f (k0) = f ′(k0), hence f = f ′.
Now suppose that diagram
w
i //
j 
s
l
w′ i
′
// s′
is a pullback of i ′ and l. First note that because this diagram commutes,
l(i(w)) = i ′( j (w)) ⊆ l(s) ∩ i ′(w′). Assume that there exists some k ∈ l(s) ∩ i ′(w′) but k 6∈ l(i(w)), then
i ′−1(k) 6∈ j (w), and l−1(k) 6∈ i(w). Let w0 = w + {k} and define j0 : w0 → w′ and i0 : w0 → s by:
j0(k′) = j (k′), i0(k′) = i(k′) for any k′ ∈ w, and j0(k) = i ′−1(k), i0(k) = l−1(k). Clearly, i ′ ◦ j0 = l ◦ i , i.e.,
( j0, l) is a morphism from i0 to i ′ in I→, but there is no injection from w0 to w, which is a contradiction to the fact
that diagram (11) is a pullback, hence l(s) ∩ i ′(w′) ⊆ l(i(w)) = i ′( j (w)). 
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Define the category PI→ with objects being tuples 〈w, i, s〉 and morphisms being pairs ( j, l) : 〈w, i, s〉 →
〈w′, i ′, s′〉, such that the following commuting diagram is a pullback in I:
w
i //
j

s
l

w′ i
′
// s′
,
where i, i ′, j, l are all injections in I. The composite of morphisms in PI→ is well-defined since the composite of
two pullbacks is still a pullback. Clearly, the category PI→ is a subcategory of I→—it has the same collection of
objects as I→, but fewer morphisms.
The underlying intuition of PI→ is that a “world” is divided into two separate parts—secret keys and non-secret
keys, both increasing independently as the computation goes along. This can be formalized using the category I × I,
where the two components of an object (w, u) represent the two distinct sets respectively. Indeed, the category I × I
is equivalent to the category PI→: define a functor F : PI→ → I × I: for every ( j, l) : 〈w, i, s〉 → 〈w′, i ′, s′〉 ∈
PI→,
F〈w, i, s〉 = (i(w), s\i(w)),
F( j, l) = (l|i(w), l|s\i(w)),
and another functor G : I × I → PI→: for every j : w → w′, l : u → u′ ∈ I
G(w, u) = (w, iw,u, w + u),
G( j, l) = ( j, j + l),
where iw,u : w → w + u is the left injection. The two functors form an equivalence between PI→ and I × I.
The category I × I is often abbreviated as I2 in the rest of the paper. Also, we introduce some notations on I × I
for the sake of simplicity, and in the next section on the abstract derivation of logical relations, we shall use variables
like ss, i i , to denote objects and morphisms in I × I when the precision of their components is not necessary.
• l and r are the projection operations on both objects and morphisms: if ss is an object in I2, l (ss) and r (ss) denote
respectively the left and the right components of ss, and similar for morphisms.
• The disjoint union operator + is generalized on pairs: for every pair of objects (w, u), (w′, u′) ∈ I2, (w, u) +
(w′, u′) = (w + w′, u + u′), and similar for morphisms.
• Given an object ss ∈ I2, we write ŝs for the disjoint union of the two components of ss, i.e., ŝs = l (ss) + r (ss),
and similarly for morphisms: î i for l (i i) + r (i i) where i i : ss → ss′ ∈ I2. Clearly, î i is an injection from ŝs to
ŝs′. For objects and morphisms denoted by (w, u), ( j, l) where components are explicitly given, we use the same
notation ŵu for w + u and ĵ l for j + l.
• The following equations are also obvious: ̂ss + ss′ = ŝs+ ŝs′ and ̂i i + i i ′ = î i+ î i ′, for every objects ss, ss′ ∈ I2
and every morphisms i i, i i ′ ∈ I2.
4.2. Logical relations derived over SetI×I
To define logical relations for the cryptographic metalanguage, we switch from SetI→ to SetI2—the category
of functors from I2 to Set and natural transformations. Necessary properties for the categorical derivation must be
checked.
SetI2 is cartesian closed: products and coproducts are defined pointwise; exponentials are defined by the standard
construction in covariant presheaves. SetI2 has pullbacks too, taken pointwise.
Define a strong monad (T,η,µ, t) on SetI2 by:
• TA = colimss′ A(_ + ss′) : I2 → Set . On objects, TAss = colimss′ A(ss + ss′) is the set of all equivalence
classes of pairs (ss′, a), with ss′ ∈ I2 and a ∈ A(ss + ss′), modulo the smallest equivalence relation ∼ such that
(ss′, a) ∼ (ss′′, A(idss+ j j)a) for every morphism j j : ss′ → ss′′ in I2. We write [ss′, a] for the equivalence class
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of (ss′, a). On morphisms, TAii with i i : ss → ss1 ∈ I2, maps the equivalence class [ss′, a] to the equivalence
class [ss′, A(i i + idss′)a].
• For every f : A → B in SetI2 , T f ss : TAss → TBss is defined by T f ss[ss′, a] = [ss′, f (ss + ss′)a]. This is
compatible with ∼.
• η Ass : Ass → TAss is defined by η Ass(a) = [(∅,∅), a].
• µAss : T2Ass → TAss is defined byµAss[ss′, [ss′′, a]] = [ss′ + ss′′, a].
• tA,Bss : Ass × TBss → T(A × B)ss is defined by tA,Bss(a, [ss′, b]) = [ss′, (Aiiss,ss′a, b)] where i iss,ss′ :
ss → ss + ss′ ∈ I2 is the morphism such that both l (i iss,ss′) : l (ss) → l (ss) + l (ss′) and r (i iss,ss′) : r (ss) →
r (ss)+ r (ss′) are left injections.
Now define a functor V : I2 → I mapping an object ss to ŝs and a morphism i i to î i . Let |_| : SetI → SetI2
be the functor idSet V . On an object A, |A| is equal to A ◦ V , that is, for every object ss ∈ I2, |A|ss = Aŝs, and for
every morphism i i ∈ I2, |A|i i = Aîi . On a morphism f (a natural transformation), for every object ss in I2, the
component | f |ss is equal to fŝs . The functor |_| preserves finite products.
Let σ : T|_| → |T_| (T is the strong monad over the category SetI ) be the monad morphism defined by
σAss[ss′, a] = [ŝs′, a], for every object A in SetI and ss ∈ I2. This is well-defined as |A|(ss+ss′) = A(̂ss + ss′) =
A(ŝs + ŝs′). Accordingly, define σ(A1,A2) : T|A1 × A2| → |TA1| × |TA2| as(σA1 ◦T|pi1|, σA2 ◦T|pi2|):
σ(A1,A2)ss[ss′, (a1, a2)] = ([ŝs′, a1], [ŝs′, a2]).
SetI2 has a mono factorization system consisting of pointwise surjections and pointwise injections and it is clear
that T and finite products preserve pointwise surjections. All these allow us to define a logical relation over
SubsconeSetI
2
SetI×SetI , using the categorical construction of [7].
Consider f : S ↪→ |A1 × A2| (A1, A2 ∈ SetI and S ∈ SetI2 ) as a representation of a series of binary relations
such that for every ss ∈ I2, f ss : Sss ↪→ |A1 × A2|ss = (A1 × A2)ŝs = A1ŝs × A2ŝs is an inclusion. The monadic
component of logical relations is given by mono factorization of σ〈A1,A2〉 ◦T f :
TS
T f //

T|A1 × A2|
σ〈A1,A2〉

S˜ ◦ // |TA1| × |TA2|
.
Take S˜ as the direct image of σ〈A1,A2〉 ◦T f : for every ss ∈ I2,
[s1, a1] S˜ss [s2, a2] ⇐⇒
∃ ss′ ∈ I2, ∃ a′1 ∈ A1(̂ss + ss′), ∃ a′2 ∈ A2(̂ss + ss′),
(s1, a1) ' (ŝs′, a′1) & (s2, a2) ' (ŝs′, a′2) & a′1 S(ss + ss′) a′2.
(12)
According to the definition of ', there exist finite sets s′k (k = 1, 2) and morphisms ik : sk → s′k, i ′k : ŝs′ → s′k
in I such that Ak(idŝs + ik)ak = Ak(idŝs + i ′k)a′k . Let ss′k = (i ′k(l (ss′)), s′k \ i ′k(l (ss′))) and i i ′k : ss′ → ss′k be a
morphism in I2 such that î i ′k = i ′k . It is easy to check that there exists ss0 in I2 with two morphisms i i ′′1 : ss′1 → ss0,
i i ′′2 : ss′2 → ss0 in I2, such that i i ′′1 ◦ i i ′1 = i i ′′2 ◦ i i ′2. Let i i = i i ′′1 ◦ i i ′1. Because S is a functor from I2 to Set :
S(idss + i i)(a′1, a′2)= |A1 × A2|(idss + i i)(a′1, a′2)
= (A1( ̂idss + i i)a′1, A2( ̂idss + i i)a′2)
= (A1(idŝs + (î i ′′1 ◦ î i ′1))a′1, A2(idŝs + (î i ′′2 ◦ î i ′2))a′2)
= (A1((idŝs + î i ′′1 ) ◦ (idŝs + i ′1))a′1, A2((idŝs + î i ′′2 ) ◦ (idŝs + i ′2))a′2)
= (A1((idŝs + î i ′′1 ) ◦ (idŝs + i1))a1, A2((idŝs + î i ′′2 ) ◦ (idŝs + i2))a2)
= (A1(idŝs + î i ′′1 ◦ i1)a1, A2(idŝs + î i ′′2 ◦ i2)a2).
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Hence, if [s1, a1] S˜ss [s2, a2], there exists an object ss0 ∈ I2, such that
A1(idŝs + i01)a1 S˜(ss + ss0) A2(idŝs + i02)a2,
where i01 = î i ′′1 ◦ i1, i02 = î i ′′2 ◦ i2. Conversely, if this relation holds, then the right-hand side of (12) holds as well, with
ss′ being ss0 and a′k (k = 1, 2) being Ak(idŝs + i0k )ak . (12) is then equivalent to
[s1, a1] S˜ss [s2, a2] ⇐⇒
∃ ss0 ∈ I2, ∃ i1 : s1 → ŝs0 ∈ I, ∃ i2 : s2 → ŝs0 ∈ I,
A1(idŝs + i1)a1 S(ss + ss0) A2(idŝs + i2)a2.
(13)
Relations for function types are defined by: for every ss ∈ I2
f1 RssBA f2 ⇐⇒ ∀i i : ss → ss′ ∈ I2,∀a1, a2 ∈ Aŝs′,
a1 Rss′A a2 ⇒ f1ŝs′〈î i, a1〉 Rss
′
B f2ŝs
′〈î i, a2〉. (14)
Logical relations derived over the category SetI2 (Rssτ ⊆ JτKŝs × JτKŝs) must satisfy the monotonicity property
so that the basic lemma holds: for every morphism i i : ss → ss′ ∈ I2,
a1 Rssτ a2 =⇒ Aîi(a1) Rss
′
τ Aîi(a2).
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity). Let (Rτ )τ type be a logical relation for the cryptographic metalanguage, derived over
the category SetI2 . IfRb is monotonic for every base type b, then (Rτ )τ type is monotonic as well.
Proof. This is an evident consequence of the functoriality of the categorical construction of logical relations over
SetI2 . 
4.3. A logical relation for the cryptographic metalanguage
Changing the underlying category of logical relations affects consequently the definition of Rkey and we switch
from (7) to the following definition: for every (w, u) ∈ I2,
k1 R(w,u)key k2 ⇐⇒ ∃k ∈ w, k1 = k2 = l (k). (15)
The definition of Rmsg is not so evident. The point here is to ensure the correctness of the basic lemma and to
capture the equivalence between messages. A natural choice is to defineRmsg by induction on the message structure.
For instance, e(a1, k1) and e(a2, k2) are related if and only if a1, a2 are related and k1, k2 are related. However, the
relation for keys (7) prevents any cipher-text encrypted with a secret key from being related. In fact, as clarified in [8],
the relation defined inductively on the message structure is the smallest relation that captures the equivalence between
messages, and the largest one is the smallest one plus the full relation over the set of cipher-texts encrypted with secret
keys. The relation for messages can be any relation in between.
Inspired by [30], we introduce a parameter ϕ to uniquely determine the relation for messages. For every pair
(w, u) ∈ I2, define a function ϕ(w,u) which maps a pair of secret keys to a set of message pairs:
ϕ(w,u) : u × u → P(JmsgKŵu × JmsgKŵu), (16)
where P denotes the power set. ϕ is called a cipher function—a group of functions indexed by a pair of sets
in I2. We say that a cipher function ϕ is monotonic if for every morphism ( j, l) : (w, u) → (w′, u′) ∈ I2,
(m1,m2) ∈ ϕ(w,u)(k1, k2) implies
(JmsgK ĵ l(m1), JmsgK ĵ l(m2)) ∈ ϕ(w′,u′)(l(k1), l(k2)).
Assume that (Rτ )τ type is a logical relation for the cryptographic metalanguage, parametrized by ϕ, with R(w,u)nat
being the identity relation, andR(w,u)key being defined as (15). The relationM(w,u),ϕ is the smallest relation such that
• (n(n1), n(n2)) ∈M(w,u),ϕ , for all (n1, n2) ∈ R(w,u),ϕnat ;
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• (k(k1), k(k2)) ∈M(w,u),ϕ , for all (k1, k2) ∈ R(w,u)key ;
• if (m1,m2) ∈M(w,u),ϕ and (m′1,m′2) ∈M(w,u),ϕ , then (p(m1,m′1), p(m2,m′2)) ∈M(w,u),ϕ ;
• if (m1,m2) ∈M(w,u),ϕ and k ∈ w, then (e(m1, k), e(m2, k)) ∈M(w,u),ϕ .
• if k1, k2 ∈ u, (m1,m2) ∈ ϕ(w,u)(k1, k2), then (e(m1, k1), e(m2, k2)) ∈M(w,u),ϕ .
Lemma 3. If the cipher function ϕ is monotonic, then the relationM(w,u),ϕ is monotonic as well: for every morphism
( j, l) : (w, u)→ (w′, u′) ∈ I2,
(m1,m2) ∈M(w,u),ϕ =⇒ (JmsgK ĵ l(m1), JmsgK ĵ l(m2)) ∈M(w′,u′),ϕ .
Proof. We prove by induction on the message structure. In particular, when m1 = e(m′1, k1) and m2 = e(m′2, k2),
• either k1 = k2 ∈ w and (m′1,m′2) ∈ M(w,u),ϕ , so ĵ l(k1) = ĵ l(k2) ∈ l (w′). By induction,
(JmsgK ĵ l(m′1), JmsgK ĵ l(m′2)) ∈M(w′,u′),ϕ , hence
(e(JmsgK ĵ l(m′1), ĵ l(k1)), e(JmsgK ĵ l(m′2), ĵ l(k2))) ∈M(w′,u′),ϕ,
• or k1, k2 ∈ u and (m′1,m′2) ∈ ϕ(w,u)(k1, k2), then ĵ l(k1), ĵ l(k2) ∈ r (u′). Because ϕ is monotonic,
(JmsgK ĵ l(m′1), JmsgK ĵ l(m′2)) ∈ ϕ(w′,u′)( ĵ l(k1), ĵ l(k2)),
hence (e(JmsgK ĵ l(m′1), ĵ l(k1)), e(JmsgK ĵ l(m′2), ĵ l(k2))) ∈M(w′,u′),ϕ . 
We then arrive at the following logical relation for the cryptographic metalanguage:
Definition 2 (Cryptographic Logical Relation). The relations R(w,u),ϕτ ⊆ JτKŵu × JτKŵu, with τ a type in the
cryptographic metalanguage (JτK ∈ SetI ), (w, u) ∈ I2 and ϕ a cipher function, are defined by induction on types, as
follows:
n1 R(w,u),ϕnat n2 ⇐⇒ n1 = n2;
k1 R(w,u),ϕkey k2 ⇐⇒ ∃k ∈ w, k1 = k2 = l (k);
m1 R(w,u),ϕmsg m2 ⇐⇒ (m1,m2) ∈M(w,u),ϕ;
(a1, a′1)R(w,u),ϕτ×τ ′ (a2, a′2)⇐⇒ a1 R(w,u),ϕτ a2 & a′1 R(w,u),ϕτ ′ a′2;
a1 R(w,u),ϕopt[τ ] a2 ⇐⇒ a1 R(w,u),ϕτ a2 or a1 = a2 = ⊥;
f1 R(w,u),ϕτ→τ ′ f2 ⇐⇒
∀( j, l) : (w, u)→ (w′, u′) ∈ I2,∀a1, a2 ∈ JτKs′,
a1 R(w
′,u′),ϕ
τ a2 ⇒ f1ŵ′u′( ĵ l, a1)R(w
′,u′),ϕ
τ ′ f2ŵ
′u′( ĵ l, a2);
[s1, a1]R(w,u),ϕTτ [s2, a2] ⇐⇒
∃(w0, u0) ∈ I2, l1 : s1 → ŵ0u0, l2 : s2 → ŵ0u0 ∈ I,JτK(idŵu + l1)(a1)R(w+w0,u+u0),ϕτ JτK(idŵu + l2)(a2).
Proposition 4 (Monotonicity). The cryptographic logical relation (R(w,u),ϕτ )τ type is monotonic if the cipher
functions ϕ is monotonic.
Proof. Clearly, in the cryptographic logical relation, all relations for base types are monotonic. In particular,
Lemma 3 shows that R(w,u),ϕmsg is monotonic since the cipher function ϕ is monotonic. According to Proposition 2,
the cryptographic logical relation is monotonic. 
The Basic Lemma of the cryptographic logical relation holds for a non-trivial collection of cipher functions, namely
all monotonic cipher functions.
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Lemma 5. If ϕ is a monotonic cipher function, then for every morphism ( j, l) : (w, u) → (w′, u′) ∈ PI→ and for
every pair of environments ρ1, ρ2 ∈ JΓ Kŵu,
ρ1 R(w,u),ϕΓ ρ2 =⇒ JΓ K ĵ l(ρ1)R(w′,u′),ϕΓ JΓ K ĵ l(ρ2).
Proof. This is a corollary of Proposition 4. 
Proposition 6 (Basic Lemma). Let (R(w,u),ϕτ )τ type be a cryptographic logical relation where ϕ is a monotonic cipher
function. For every well-typed term Γ ` t : τ and every pair of environments ρ1, ρ2 ∈ JΓ Kŵu,
ρ1 R(w,u),ϕΓ ρ2 =⇒ JtKŵuρ1 R(w,u),ϕτ JtKŵuρ2.
Proof. It is proved by induction on the structure of term t . We detail the cases of functions, monadic constructs and
cryptographic primitives.
• Functions λx .t of type τ → τ ′: Let f1 = Jλx .tKŵuρ1 and f2 = Jλx .tKŵuρ2. For every morphism ( j, l) :
(w, u) → (w′, u′) in I2, let a1, a2 ∈ JτKŵ′u′ be any related values at (w′, u′), i.e., a1 R(w′,u′),ϕτ a2. According to
Proposition 4, R(w,u),ϕ is monotonic, so
JΓ K ĵ l(ρ1) ∪ {x 7→ a1}R(w′,u′),ϕΓ ,x :τ JΓ K ĵ l(ρ2) ∪ {x 7→ a2}
and by induction,
JtKŵ′u′(JΓ K ĵ l(ρ1) ∪ {x 7→ a1})R(w′,u′),ϕτ ′ JtKŵ′u′(JΓ K ĵ l(ρ2) ∪ {x 7→ a2}),
i.e., f1ŵ′u′( ĵ l, a1)R(w
′,u′),ϕ
τ ′ f2ŵ
′u′( ĵ l, a2) (according to the semantics defined in Fig. 2), hence f1 R(w,u),ϕτ→τ ′ f2.• Fresh key generation constant new, of type Tkey: JnewKŵuρ = [{k}, k], where k 6∈ ŵu, no matter what ρ is. Take
({k},∅) ∈ I2. It is clear that k R(w+{k},u),ϕkey k, hence [{k}, k]R(w,u),ϕTkey [{k}, k].
• Trivial computations val(t) of type Tτ , where t is of type τ : Because Jval(t)Kŵuρ = [∅, JtKŵuρ] and by
induction, JtKŵuρ1 R(w,u),ϕτ JtKŵuρ2, according to the definition ofRTτ , Jval(t)Kŵuρ1 R(w,u),ϕTτ Jval(t)Kŵuρ2.• Sequential computations let x ⇐ t1 in t2 of type Tτ ′, where x is of type τ , t1 is of type Tτ and t2 is of type Tτ ′:
Let Jt1Kŵuρ1 = [s1, a1] and Jt1Kŵuρ2 = [s2, a2]. By induction, [s1, a1] R(w,u),ϕTτ [s2, a2], so there exist some
(w0, u0) ∈ I2 and two injections i1 : s1 → ŵ0u0, i2 : s2 → ŵ0u0 such thatJτK(i1 + idŵu)a1 R(w+w0,u+u0),ϕτ JτK(i2 + idŵu)a2.
Let Jt2K(ŵu + ŵ0u0)ρ′1 = [s′1, b1] and Jt2K(ŵu + ŵ0u0)ρ′2 = [s′2, b2], where
ρ′m = JΓ Kinlŵu,ŵ0u0(ρm) ∪ {x 7→ JτK(im + idŵu)am}, (m = 1, 2).
Again by induction, there exist some (w′0, u′0) ∈ I2 and two injections i ′1 : s′1 → ŵ′0u′0, i ′2 : s′2 → ŵ′0u′0 such that
JτK(i ′1 + idŵu+ŵ0u0)b1 R(w+w0+w′0,u+u0+u′0),ϕτ JτK(i ′2 + idŵu+ŵ0u0)b2.
According to the definition of monad T on SetI , [sm, am] = [ŵ0u0, JτK(im + idŵu)am], soJlet x ⇐ t1 in t2Kŵuρm = [ŵ0u0 + s′m, bm].
Considering (w0 + w′0, u0 + u′0) ∈ I2 and injections
idŵ0u0 + i ′1 : ŵ0u0 + s1 → ŵ0u0 + ŵ′0u′0, idŵ0u0 + i ′2 : ŵ0u0 + s2 → ŵ0u0 + ŵ′0u′0
we get [ŵ0u0 + s′1, b1]R(w,u),ϕTτ ′ [ŵ0u0 + s′2, b2].• Encryption enc(t1, t2) of type msg, where t is of type msg and t2 is of type key: First, let s = ŵu and
let a1 = Jt1Ksρ1, a2 = Jt1Ksρ2, k1 = Jt2Ksρ1 and k2 = Jt1Ksρ2, then Jenc(t1, t2)Ksρ1 = e(a1, k1) andJenc(t1, t2)Ksρ2 = e(a2, k2). By induction, a1 R(w,u),ϕmsg a2 and k1 R(w,u),ϕkey k2, i.e., there exists k ∈ w such that
k1 = k2 = l (k). According to the definition of the cryptographic message relation, e(a1, k1)M(w,u),ϕe(a2, k2), i.e.,Jenc(t1, t2)Ksρ1 R(w,u),ϕmsg Jenc(t1, t2)Ksρ2.
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• Decryption dec(t1, t2) of type opt[msg], where t is of type msg and t2 is of type key: First, let s = ŵu and
let a1 = Jt1Ksρ1, a2 = Jt1Ksρ2, k1 = Jt2Ksρ1 and k2 = Jt2Ksρ2. By induction, k1 R(w,u),ϕkey k2, i.e., there exists
k ∈ w such that k1 = k2 = l (k). If a1 = e(a′1, l (k)) and a2 = e(a′2, l (k)) for some a′1, a′2 ∈ JmsgKs, thenJdec(t1, t2)Ksρ1 = a′1 and Jdec(t1, t2)Ksρ2 = a′2, and by the definition of the cryptographic message relation,
a′1Mi,ϕa′2; if a1 6= e(a′1, l (k)) and a2 6= e(a′2, l (k)), then Jdec(t1, t2)Ksρ1 = Jdec(t1, t2)Ksρ2 = ⊥. Note that
according to the definition ofM(w,u),ϕ , the only case where a1, a2 are related cipher-texts is that, both of them are
encrypted by either the same key in w, or keys in u, so it is not possible that one of a1, a2 is a cipher-text encrypted
with key l (k)while the other is not, and the above analysis includes all the cases where a1, a2 are related. Therefore,Jdec(t1, t2)Ksρ1 R(w,u),ϕopt[msg] Jdec(t1, t2)Ksρ2. 
5. Verifying the Needham–Schroeder–Lowe protocol
The approach of logical relations can be used to prove the secrecy property of cryptographic protocols in practice—
we apply this technique to Lowe’s fixed version of the Needham–Schroeder’s public key protocol [22,13] and show
that instances of the protocol with different secret messages can be related by the cryptographic logical relation, then
by the soundness result (Theorem 8) in the next section, we conclude that the protocol satisfies the secrecy property.
The encoding of the protocol is detailed in Fig. 3, together with its specification, which is already structured as
the diagram for the sake of clarity. The whole protocol is encoded as the following program in the cryptographic
metalanguage:
NSL(m) ≡ ν(ka, kb, ke).〈λx .{x}ka , λx .{x}kb , ke, Fb〉,
where the first two functions model the public keys of the two principals, ke is the attacker’s key, and Fb is defined in
Fig. 3. The identities of principals A, B are encoded by natural numbers, and the type of the encoded protocol is
τNSL = T((msg→ msg)× (msg→ msg)× key× τb),
τb = msg→ opt[T(msg× τa)],
τa = msg→ opt[T(msg× τ ′b)],
τ ′b = msg→ opt[msg× τ ′a],
τ ′a = msg→ opt[msg].
The following proposition shows that instances of the program with different messages can be related by the
cryptographic logical relation.
Proposition 7. For every pair of messages m1 6= m2, there exists a monotonic cipher-function ϕ such thatJNSL(m1)K∅R(∅,∅),ϕτNSL JNSL(m2)K∅.
Proof. Consider the denotation of the protocol program
[{ka, kb, ke}, 〈pka, pkb, ke, fb〉],
where pka, pkb are the denotations of the two functions λx .{x}ka , λx .{x}kb , and fb is the denotation of Fb, all defined
over the set {ka, kb, ke}. Clearly, keys ka and kb should be considered as secret keys, and ke must be non-secret so that
it can be related to itself. Let w = {ke} and u = {ka, kb}. We shall define a cipher function ϕ so that the two public
key functions pka, pkb will be related to themselves, and the two instances fb[m1/m] and fb[m2/m] will be related,
at the world (w, u).
We say that a cipher function ϕ is smaller than another function ϕ′ if for every (w, u) ∈ I2 and for every pair of
keys k1, k2 ∈ u, ϕ(w,u)(k1, k2) ⊆ ϕ′(w,u)(k1, k2). Now define ϕ as the smallest cipher function such that (for the sake
of clarity , we shall omit the semantic message constructors n, k, p and some syntactic abbreviations are also used in
semantics):
• for every morphism ( j, l) : ({ke}, {ka, kb})→ (w0, u0) ∈ I2,
(m1,m2) ∈M〈w0,u0〉,ϕ =⇒ (m1,m2) ∈ ϕ(w0,u0)(l(ka), l(ka)), (17)
(m1,m2) ∈M〈w0,u0〉,ϕ =⇒ (m1,m2) ∈ ϕ(w0,u0)(l(kb), l(kb)); (18)
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Fb ≡ λx .letopt X ⇐ getnum(x) in
some(ν(Nb).〈{[k(Nb), n(B)]}Kb(X), Fa〉)
Fa ≡ λ{y}ka .letopt Y ⇐ getnum(snd(y)) in
if (Y = B) then
some(ν(Na).〈{[k(Na), fst(y), A]}kb , F ′b〉)
F ′b ≡ λ{x ′}kb .letopt N ⇐ getkey(pi32 (x ′)) in
letopt X ′ ⇐ getnum(pi33 (x ′)) in
if (N = Nb) then if (X ′ = X) then
some(〈{pi31 (x ′)}Kb(X), F ′a〉)
F ′a ≡ λ{y′}ka .letopt N ′ ⇐ getkey(y′) in
if (N ′ = Na) then some({m}Na )
with the following abbreviations:
letopt x ⇐ t1 in t2 ≡ case t1 of some(x) in t2 else none,
{t1}t2 ≡ enc(t1, t2),[t1, t2, . . . , tn] ≡ p(t1, . . . , p(tn−1, tn) · · · ),
λ{x}k .t ≡ λy.letopt x ⇐ dec(y, k) in t,
eq(k1, k2) ≡ dec(enc(k(k1), k1), k2), where k1, k2 are of type key,
if t1 = t2 then t3 ≡ letopt _⇐ eq(t1, t2) in t3,
pini (t) ≡

fst(snd · · · snd︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
(t) · · · ) if i < n,
snd(· · · snd︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
(t) · · · ) if i = n,
Ka(X) ≡ case eq(X, B) of some(_) in kb else ke,
Kb(X) ≡ case eq(X, A) of some(_) in ka else ke
Fig. 3. Needham–Schroeder–Lowe’s public key protocol and its encoding.
• for every morphism ( j1, l1) : ({ke, Nb}, {ka, kb})→ (w1, u1) ∈ I2,
([N , B], [N ′, B]) ∈ ϕ(w1,u1)(l1(ka), l1(ka))
=⇒ ([Na, N , A], [Na, N ′, A]) ∈ ϕ(w1,u1+{Na})(l1(kb), l1(kb)); (19)
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• for every morphism ( j2, l2) : ({ke, Nb}, {ka, kb, Na})→ (w2, u2) ∈ I2,
([N , j2(Nb), A], [N ′, j2(Nb), A]) ∈ ϕ(w2,u2)(l2(kb), l2(kb))
=⇒ (N , N ′) ∈ ϕ(w2,u2)(l2(ka), l2(ka)), (20)
(JmsgK ĵ2l2(m1), JmsgK ĵ2l2(m2)) ∈ ϕ(w2,u2)(l2(Na), l2(Na)); (21)
• ϕ is monotonic, i.e., for every morphism ( j, l) : (w, u)→ (w′, u′) ∈ I2, for every pair of keys k1, k2 ∈ u,
(m1,m2) ∈ ϕ(w,u)(k1, k2) =⇒
(JmsgK ĵ l(m1), JmsgK ĵ l(m2)) ∈ ϕ(w′,u′)(l(k1), l(k2)).
(17) and (18) ensure that the functions pka and pkb are related with themselves.
The key point of relating the two instances of fb is that Nb must be non-secret, because we can apply fb to the
attacker’s identity, which consequently requires that Nb must be related to itself. This actually corresponds to the
crucial step in Lowe’s attack [13] where the attacker starts a new session and asks the principal B to send a fresh
nonce encrypted by the attacker’s key.
In addition to the choice of secret fresh keys, we should also relate the instances of Fa , at ({ke, Nb}, {ka, kb}).
This is ensured by (19), whenever the instances of F ′b are related at the proper world. Here comes again the question
of clarifying secret keys and non-secret keys among fresh keys, and this time the only fresh key Na must be secret,
because otherwise the two instances of F ′a will be obviously not related.
(20), together with (19), then ensures that the instances of F ′b are related (also because ϕ is smallest), and (21)
ensures that the instances of F ′a are related. 
Note that in the program NSL(m), when Fb is applied to the attacker’s identity, F ′b has also the underlying mapping
{N ′, Nb, E}kb 7−→ {N ′}ke .
This does not affect the proof as the point here is to keep Na secret and the cipher function in the proof does not
contain ([Na, Nb, E], [Na, Nb, E]) in any ϕ(kb, kb). This is how Lowe fixes the protocol to prevent the attack. In fact,
instances of Needham and Schroeder’s original protocol cannot be related by the cryptographic logical relations. In
that case, (19) becomes
([N , B], [N ′, B]) ∈ ϕw1,u1(ka, ka)
=⇒ ([Na, N ], [Na, N ′]) ∈ ϕw1,u1+{Na}(kb, kb),
so we have ([Na, Nb], [Na, Nb]) in ϕ(kb, kb). Also, the above mapping becomes
{N ′, Nb}kb 7−→ {N ′}ke ,
then Na must be non-secret so that the instances of F ′b can be related, while this is contradiction of relating instances
of F ′a , which requires that Na must be secret. It provides some information which might help in the search of attacks,
though from the non-existence of logical relations, we cannot conclude that the protocol does not satisfy the secrecy
property, due to the lack of completeness results at necessary types.
6. Contextual equivalence
As argued in [8], standard definitions of contextual equivalence in the λ-calculus do not fit well in the language with
monadic types and dynamic key generation. To define the contextual equivalence for such a language, especially at the
denotational level, one must take into account several subtle points: first, contexts must be allowed to do computations,
which means that the type for contexts should be a monadic type; second, since context model attackers, they should
be able to access non-secret keys. A definition of contextual equivalence is given in [8] and we adapt it here by using
the category SetI2 :
Definition 3 (Contextual Equivalence). Two values a1, a2 are said to be contextually equivalent at (w, u) (a1, a2 ∈JτKŵu), written a1 ≈(w,u)τ a2, if and only if, for every morphism ( j, l) : (w, u) → (w′, u′) in I2 and for every term
C such that w′ : key, x : τ ` C : Tnat is derivable,JCKŵ′u′[w′ 7→ w′, x 7→ JτK ĵ l(a1)] = JCKŵ′u′[w′ 7→ w′, x 7→ JτK ĵ l(a2)].
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With the cryptographic logical relation (Rτ )τ type, we can deduce the contextual equivalence in the cryptographic
metalanguage.
Theorem 8 (Soundness of the Cryptographic Logical Relation). For every pair (w, u) ∈ I2, if a1 R(w,u),ϕτ a2, then
a1 ≈(w,u)τ a2, where (Rτ )τ type is the cryptographic logical relation as defined in Definition 2 and ϕ is a monotonic
cipher function.
Proof. Take any morphism ( j, l) : (w, u) → (w′, u′) ∈ I2. BecauseR(w,u),ϕτ is monotonic (Proposition 4), we haveJτK ĵ l(a1)R(w′,u′),ϕτ JτK ĵ l(a2). Now take any context C such that x : τ,w′ : key ` C : Tnat is derivable. According
to the Basic Lemma (Proposition 6),
JCKŵ′u′[w′ 7→ w′, x 7→ JτK ĵ l(a1)] R(w′,u′),ϕTnat JCKŵ′u′[w′ 7→ w′, x 7→ JτK ĵ l(a2)].
It is easy to check thatR(w′,u′),ϕTnat is the equality, soJCKŵ′u′[w′ 7→ w′, x 7→ JτK ĵ l(a1)] = JCKŵ′u′[w′ 7→ w′, x 7→ JτK ĵ l(a2)],
hence a1 ≈(w,u)τ a2. 
Once we can use logical relations to establish the contextual equivalence, it is natural to ask whether all contextually
equivalent programs are captured by logical relations. This is the issue of completeness of logical relations. However,
completeness of logical relations is in general difficult to achieve—in typed λ-calculi, usually one can only get
completeness for types up to first order (the order of types is defined inductively: ord(b) = 0 for every base type
b; ord(Tτ) = ord(τ ); ord(τ → τ ′) = max(ord(τ )+ 1, ord(τ ′))).
Completeness of logical relations in the cryptographic metalanguage becomes subtler due to the introduction of
monadic types. In fact, if we do not make restrictions on monadic types, logical relations for the key generation monad
are not even complete for zero-order types. Consider the following two programs of type TTkey:
let k ⇐ new in val(let k′ ⇐ new in val(k)),
let k ⇐ new in val(let k′ ⇐ new in val(k′)).
Clearly, these two programs are contextually equivalent: the final value of each program is a fresh key and no context
can distinguish between two fresh keys. The denotations of the two programs in SetI can be easily computed, which
are [{k1}, [{k′1}, k1]] and [{k2}, [{k′2}, k′2]] respectively. To relate these two programs with logical relations derived over
SetI2 , one has to find two injections i : {k1, k2} → s and i ′ : {k′1, k′2} → s′ such that (i + i ′)(k1) = (i + i ′)(k′2), but
this is impossible since k1 and k′2 are mapped by i + i ′ to two values in disjoint sets s and s′. However, this example
does not break the completeness result of Pitts and Stark’s operational logical relations for the nu-calculus, because
the translation of the nu-calculus in Stark’s computational metalanguage excludes any type like TTτ . It will not affect
the application of logical relations in verifying protocols, as the encoding of protocols never involves the above types.
To get the completeness of logical relations for all types, one can appeal to the notion of lax logical relations [26].
Defining lax logical relations follows the same construction as in defining logical relations except that the functor R
in the diagram (3) is not required to be a representation of CCCs, but a product preserving functor only. Lax logical
relations for monadic types might also require R to preserve strong monads so as to be strict (non-lax) at monadic
types. Lax logical relations for key generation monad, and eventually for cryptographic languages, are discussed
in [8], where Goubault-Larrecq et al. define logical relations which are lax at encryption and function types but strict
at monadic types and show that they are sound and complete for all types. More discussions about the completeness
of cryptographic logical relations can be found in [31, Chapter 5].
7. Conclusion
Logical relations are proved to be an effective technique to deduce contextual equivalence in typed λ-calculi,
and according to Sumii and Pierce, can be used to verify cryptographic protocols. The work presented in this paper
is rather viewed as a further exploration based on their original work. In particular, we strengthen the underlying
mathematical basis of their model. The result also owes much to Stark’s work [29], on the aspect of manipulating the
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difficulty of dynamic key generation, and to the work by Goubault-Larrecq et al. on the categorical construction of
logical relations for monadic types [7]. The initial idea of redefining Sumii and Pierce’s logical relations using the
categorical construction, has led us to an interesting exploration of what should be the proper category for defining
cryptographic logical relations. The progressive revision of categories culminates in SetI×I , with an application of
the cryptographic logical relations in verifying the Needham–Schroeder–Lowe’s public key protocol.
We rest throughout on the category SetI for interpreting the language, but use a richer category to define logical
relations. This is not as in usual cases where logical relations are defined over the same model of semantics, e.g.,
Stark extends the model for the nu-calculus in order to define his denotational logical relations. Our approach avoids
complicating the semantics. Besides, the logical relations presented in this paper are of the style of Kripke logical
relations [18], which are actually a special case of the categorical form of logical relations derived over functor
categories. The Kripke style of logical relations have also been used elsewhere, e.g., in [10] for characterizing the
λ-definability and in [23] for building a full-abstract model of PCF.
One might notice that the cryptographic metalanguage does not have recursion. It is not necessary for modeling
cryptographic protocols: the only use of recursion in this setting is to model attackers running recursively, but such
attackers cannot do more than non-recursive attackers regarding their capability of exploiting secrets—if a protocol
is vulnerable, we can always design an attack that executes the protocol with finitely many sessions. But dealing with
recursion is always interesting from the viewpoint of programming language theory. The difficulty here is finding a
workable notion of “domain” in functor categories. A better model for manipulating dynamic name creation, with the
existence of recursion, is probably the continuation monad proposed by Shinwell and Pitts, which is constructed with
domains in the world of FM-sets [28]. Deriving logical relations over their model should be standard provided that the
category FM-Cpo (or FM-Cpo⊥) satisfies all the requirements of the construction in [7]. In fact, in [28] Shinwell and
Pitts also define a logical relation (between the model using FM-sets and the syntax of their language), but it is remain
to clarify whether we can reach the same logical relation following the categorical construction. Applying FM-sets
based techniques in the domain of security is also worthy of further exploration.
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